The proposed tank would bridge the gap between the Leclerc and the delayed Franco-German Main Ground Combat System. The proposed main battle tank would bridge the gap between the Leclerc and the delayed Franco-German Main Ground Combat System.
I would also like to know how a large, expensive, relatively cumbersome, vehicle can possibly defend itself against hordes of cheap, mass produced flying explosives.
Soft kill systems (e.g. MUSS2.0), hard kill systems (Trophy, Strike Shield), independent remote-controlled weapon stations with anti-air capabilities (KNDS’ Leopard 2-A-RC3.0 demonstrator for example came with one with a 30x113mm calibre).
(Bonus points for the smaller profile and the lower weight at the same or better protection level enabled by using remote turrets…)
The war in Ukraine is more defined by the lack of high-tech to neutralize drones (vehicles and air-defense being old -or available in very small numbers-, air-defense in Russia also not even close to performing to the standards they should on paper) than by the drones themselves. Future military planning will be more defined by adding those anti-drone capabilities already existing but not yet widely used than by mass spammed cheap drones themselves.
(For reference: Maybe you remember the Bayraktar hype in the beginning days of Russia’s invasion… and then it just died quickly and silently. Because the actual factor was not the drone itself but the initial failure to close the gap exploited by the drone. And then Russia adapted by moving air-defense capable of handling those drones closer.)
Soft kill systems (e.g. MUSS2.0), hard kill systems (Trophy, Strike Shield), independent remote-controlled weapon stations with anti-air capabilities (KNDS’ Leopard 2-A-RC3.0 demonstrator for example came with one with a 30x113mm calibre).
(Bonus points for the smaller profile and the lower weight at the same or better protection level enabled by using remote turrets…)
The war in Ukraine is more defined by the lack of high-tech to neutralize drones (vehicles and air-defense being old -or available in very small numbers-, air-defense in Russia also not even close to performing to the standards they should on paper) than by the drones themselves. Future military planning will be more defined by adding those anti-drone capabilities already existing but not yet widely used than by mass spammed cheap drones themselves.
(For reference: Maybe you remember the Bayraktar hype in the beginning days of Russia’s invasion… and then it just died quickly and silently. Because the actual factor was not the drone itself but the initial failure to close the gap exploited by the drone. And then Russia adapted by moving air-defense capable of handling those drones closer.)