The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.

Devices running only local accounts are not affected.

  • pipe01@programming.dev
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    18 hours ago

    The attack also starts from a lock screen, which means it targets drives BitLocker has already unlocked at boot, as the default TPM-only setup does. A startup PIN would likely stop an attacker before the lock screen ever loads, though that has not been tested.

    • semi [he/him]@lemmy.ml
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      18 hours ago

      Ah, so BitLocker just decrypts the drive using keys from TPM without a password required? That’s quite far on the convenience over security scale.

      I would argue that this isn’t a BitLocker bypass so much as a classic login screen bypass, then.

      In any case, thanks for the explanation

      • Haquer@lemmy.today
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        10 hours ago

        As someone who sets up laptops to go out to our workers: we have a Group Policy that forces all bitlockers to be a PIN variety; however you can absolutely set it up just to have the keys in the TPM and at that point the disk is encrypted but boots into Windows without ever asking for a PIN. That is basically useless as it only protects from the drive being taken out of the machine.